University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1906

Delegation of Authority by an Agent
Floyd R. Mechem

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Floyd R. Mechem, "Delegation of Authority by an Agent," 5 Michigan Law Review 94 (1906).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY BY AN AGENT*
§ I. DniXEOATUS NON POTST D4LXGARI.-The appointment of an
agent in any particular case is made, as a rtile, because he is supposed by his principal to have some fitness for the performance of
the duties to be undertaken. In certain cases his appointment is
owing to the fact that he is considered, to be especially and particularly fit. The undertaking demands judgment and disdretion, which
he is supposed to possess; or it requires the skill and learning of an
expert, which he assumes to be; or personal force and influence are
desirable, and these the agent is thought to be able to exercise. Here
is the delectus personce, and it is obvious that unless the principal
has exfressly or impliedly consented to the employment of a substitute, the agent owes to the principal the duty of a personal
discharge of the trust.
I § 2. Gr =RAI RuLi.-Hence it is the general rule f the law
9
that in the absence of any authority, either express or implied, to
employ a subagent, the trust committed to the agent is presumed
to be exclusively personal and cannot be delegated by him to another
so as to affect the rights of the principal.1
The principal may, of course, expressly authorize the appointment
of subagents, the delegation of the authority or the substitution of
another in the place of the agent named; and formal powers of
attorney quite frequently expressly confer "full power of substitu*Adapted from the forthcoming second edition of the writer's treatise on Agency.
§ 2. 1 Appleton Bank v. McGilvray, 4 Gray (Mass.) 5x8, 64 Am. Dec. 92; McCormick v.
Bush, 38 Tex. 314; White v. Dayidson, 8 Md. 169, 63 Am. Dec. 699; Lyon v. Jerome, 26
Wend. (N. Y.) 485, 37 Am. Dec. 271; Wright v. Boynton, 37 N. H. 9, 72 Am. Dec. 319;
Smith v. Sublett, 28 Tex. 163; Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Mass. 522, 3 Am. Dec. 236; Lynn v.
Burgoyne, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 4oo; Loomis v. Simpson, 13 Iowa 532; Connor v. Parker, 114
Mass. 331; Gillis z'. Bailey, 21 N. H. 149; Furnas v. Frankman, 6 Neb. 429; Harralson v.
Stein, 5o Ala. 347; Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. v. DeJarnett, iii Ala. 248; Bronfley V.
Aday, 7o Ark. 351, 68 S. W. 32; North American Trust Co. v. Chappell, 79 Ark. 507, 69
S. W. 546; Harris v. San Diego Flume Co., 87 Cal. 526, 25 Pac. 758; Dingley v. McDonaid, 124 Cal. 682, 57 Pac. 574; National Cash Register Co. v. Ison, 94 Ga. 463, 21 S. E.
228; Fudge v. Seckner Contracting Co., 80 11. App. 35; Ruthven v. American Fire Ins.
r
Co., 92 Iowa 316, 6o N. WV 663; Floyd v. Mackey, i12 Ky. 646, 66 S. WV. 518, 23 Ky. L.
Rep. 2030; Plummer v. Green, 49 Neb. 316, 68 N. W. Soo; Carroll v. Tucker, 2 N. Y.
Misc. 397; Fargo v. Cravens, 9 S. Dak. 646, 7o N. W. 1053; Tynan v. Dulling (Tex. Civ.
App.), 25 S. W. 465; Smith v. Lowther, 35 W. Va. 300, 13 S. E. 999; Rohrbough v. United
States Exp. Co., So V. Va. 148, 40 S. E. 398; McKinnon v. Vollmar, 75 Wis. 82, 43 N. W.
800, 17 Am. St. Rep. 178, 6 L. R. A. 121; Kohl v. Beach, 107 Wis. 4o9, 83 N. W. 657, 50
L. R. A. 6oo. "One who has a bare power of authority from another to do any act, must
execute it himself, and cannot delegate it to a stranger; for this being a trust or confidence
reposed in him personally, it cannot be assigned to one whose integrity or ability may not
be known to the principal, and who, if he were known, might not be selected by him for
such a purpose. The authority is exclusively personal unless from the express language
used or from the fair presumptions growing out of the particular transaction a broader
power was intended to be conferred." BELL, J., in Wright v. Boynton, supra.
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tion and revocation," and in terms confirm whatever the attorney
named "or his substitute" may lawfully do in the premises.
The general rule is, also, as will be seen, subject to be modified
by the peculiar circumstances ahd necessities of each particular case,
from which or from the usage of trade, a power to delegate the
authority may be inferred ;2 but in the absence of such express authority or such circumstances the general rule is fixed, imperative and
inflexible, resting upon ample foundation and constantly enforced
by the courts.
The same rule applies to a servant as to an agent.8
§ 3.SAME SUBJECT-JUDGMENT AND DIscRETIoN NOT TO B, DELEGATED.-The reasons for this rule are particularly applicable to
those cases where the performance of the agency requires, upon
the part of the agent, the exercise of special skill, judgment or
discretion. Such relations are obviously created because the principal places special confidence in the particular agent -selected, and
there is abundant reason. why the trust should. not be transferred
to another of whose fitness or capacity the principal may'have no
knowledge, without the latter's express consent.1
Thus where an agent had been entrusted with the general administration of the aftairs of a trading company, but no power to
substitute others in his place had been given him, it was held that
no such power could be implied, because there was evidently a
confidence reposed in him which the company might not be willing
to repose in others.2 And so where one was appointed general
agent to conduct the sale of subscription books in a certain territory
under circumstances showiAg that the principal "depended upon
the experience, skill and energy, as well as the resources and facilities of the general agent," it was held' that his powers and duties
could not be assigned or delegated without the principal's consent.3
For the same reasons the agent who has been given the important
§ 2. 2 See post, § io, et seq.
§ 2. 3 Gwilliam v. Twist [x895] 2 Q. B. 84; Engelhart V. Farrant E18971 I Q. B. 240;
James v. Muehleback, 34 Mo. App. 512. See also 3 MICHIGAN LAW REviEW, x98.
§ 3. Emerson v. Providence Hat Co., 12 Mass. 237, 7 Am. Dec. 66; Paul v. Edwards,
I Mo. 3o; Lewis v. Ingersoll, 3 Abb. (N. Y.) App. Dec. 55; Sayre v. Nichols, 7 Cal. 535,
68 Am. Dec. 28o; Commercial Bank v. Norton, x Hill (N. Y.) 5ox; Dorchester, &c., Bank
v. New England Bank, r Cush. (Mass.) 177; Planters, &c., Bank v. First National Bank,
75 N. C. 534; Pendall v. Rench, 4 McLean (U. S. C. C.) 259; Titus v. Cairo, &c., R. Co.,
46 N. J. L. 393; North American Trust Co. v. Chappell, 7o Ark. 507, 69 S. W. 546; Plummer v. Green, 49 Neb. 3x6, 68 N. W. 5oo; McConnell v. Mackin, 22 N. Y. App. Div. 537;
Carroll v. Tucker, 2 N. Y. Misc. 397; Smith v. Lowther, 35 W. Va. 300, 13 S. E. 999;
Tynan v. Dulling, (Tex. Civ. App.), 25 S. W. 465; Kohl v. Beach, 107 Wis. 4o9, 83 N. W.
657, 5o L. R. A. 60o; Rohrbough v. U. S. Exp. Co., 5o W. Va. 148, 40 S. E. 398.
§ 3. 2 Emerson v. Providence Hat Co., supra.
§ 3. 3 Bancroft v. Scribner, 72 Fed. 988, 44 U. S. App. 480, 21 C. C. A. 352.
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power to bind his. principal by the execution of promissory notes,'
or to settle disputed claims, 5 or to adjust losses by fire,6 or to loan
money7 or receive or collect money8 cannot delegate the power to a
subagent.
A bailment of personal property to an agent with power to sell,
also creates a personal trust which cannot be delegated. 9 And so
does authority to sell real estate.10 So where an agent had been
authorized to sell real estate, but in his absence and without his
knowledge, the land was sold by one falsely assuming to be a subagent, it was held that the sale was binding neither upon the principal nor the agent, as the principal was entitled to the judgment
and discretion of the agent in making the sale."1 For similar reasons,
2
authority to lease real estate cannot be delegated.1
§ 4.

ATTORNEYS CANNOT DELEGATE PERSONAL UNDERTAKING.-

The appointment of an attorney to argue or conduct a cause, compromise a dispute, or enforce a claim, creates a personal trust, and
he can not entrust the performance of this duty to another attorney
of -his own selection, or let the case out on shares, or in any other
wise delegate the performance, without the consent of his principal.
This rule, however, does not demand that the attorney shall perform, in person, all of the merely mechanical or ministerial work
involved in the case. As will be seen in a subsequent section, the
§ 3. 4 Emerson v. Providence Hat Co., supra; Brewster v. Hobart, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 302.
§ 3. 5 Fargo v. Cravens, 9 S. Dak. 646, 7o N. W. 1053.
§ 3. 6 Ruthven v. American Fire Ins. Co., 92 Iowa 3x6, 60 N. W. 663.
§ 3. 1 Kohl v. Beach, 107 Wis. 409, 83 N. W. 65, 50 L. R. A. 6oo.
§ 3. 8 McConnell v. Mackin, 22 N. Y. App. Div. 537; Dingley v. McDonald, 724 CaL
682, 57 Pac. 574; Lewis v. Ingersoll, 2 Keyes (N. Y.) 347; Yates v. Freckleton, 2 Doug.
623; though the authority may be so restricted as to amount to no more than a power to
do a merely mechanical act, in which event the rule would not apply. Grinnell v. Buchanan,
Daly (N. Y.) 538.
§3. 9Hunt v. Douglass, 22 Vt. 128; Drum v. Harrison, 83 Ala. 384, 3 So. 715.
§3 10Floyd v. Mackey, ix2 Ky. 646, 66 S. W. 528, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2030; Bromley v.
Aday, 7o Ark. 351, 68 S. W. 32; Williams v. Moore, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 402, 58 S. W. 953;
,Carroll v. Tucker, 2 N. Y. Misc. 397; Bonwell v. Howes, x5 Daly (N. Y.) 43; Bocock v.
:Pavey, 8 Ohio St. 270.
§ 3. 11 Barret v. Rhem, 6 Bush (Ky.) 466.
§
2 Fairchild v. King, 1o2 Cal. 320.
4. 1 Eggleston v. Boardman, 37 Mich. 14; Crotty v. Eagle, 35 W. Va. 143, x3 S. E.
S; Hilton v. Crooker, 3o Neb. 707, 47 N. IV. 3; National Bank v. Oldtown Bank, Xx2
Fed. 726, 50 C. C. A. 443; Sloan v. 'Williams, 138 IIl. 43, 27 N. E. 531, z L. R. A. 496;
City of New York v. Dubois, 86 Fed. 889; Meany v. Rosenburg, 32 N. Y. Misc. 96; Reese
v. Resburgh, 54 N. Y. App. Div. 378; Lucas v. Rader, 29 Ind. App. 287, 64 N. E. 488;
Sedgwick v. Bliss, 23 Neb. 617, 37 N. xV. 483; Dickson v. Wright, 52 Miss. 585; Danley v.
Crawl, 28 Ark. 95; King V. Pope, 28 Ala. 6os; Ratcliff v. Baird, r4 Tex. 43.
If he does so, the client may declare the contract at an end, and recover whatever he has
given for the services: Hilton v. Crooker, supra. The client may, however, ratify it with
full knowledge of the facts: Reese v. Resburgh, supra.
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performance of such duties through the agency of others, falls
under a well recognized exception to the general rule.2
§ 5. ARBITRATORS CANNOT DELEGAT4 THEIR PowEis.-This rule
also applies with special force to arbitrators. They are selected by
parties who have placed particular confidence in their personal judgment, discretion and ability, and it would be a palpable injustice
if they were to be permitted to delegate their responsibilities and
powers to others.- But it is entirely proper for arbitrators, in a
case requiring it, to obtain from disinterested, persons of acknowledged skill such information and advice in reference to technical
questions submitted to them, as may be necessary to enable them
to come to correct conclusions, provided that the award is the result
of their own judgment after obtaining such information. 2 They
may also avail themselves of such mechanical 8or ministerial assistance as the nature of their duties may require'.

§ 6. AuCTIONEERs.,

BROKERS AND FACTORS CANNOT DELEGATE.-As

will be seen also when these various forms of agency are taken up,
the same rule applies to auctioneers, brokers and factors, who are
forbidden to delegate without the principal's consent the powers
confided to them not merely mechanical or ministerial.

§ 7. EXECUTORS,

ETC., CANNOT DELEGATE PERSONAL TRUSTS.-

This principle is, likewise, of frequent application to the case of persons upon whom the law has devolved discretionary or fiduciary
powers, such as executors, guardians and public trustees. Such
powers cannot be delegated without express authority.'
§ 8. SAML RULE APPLIES-TO MUNICIPAL CORBORATIONS.-The
game rule applies to the powers and duties conferred upon municipal corporations and municipal officers. Wherever judgment and
§ 4 'See post § ir; Eggleston vt. Boardman, supra.
§ S. 'David Harley Co. v. Barnefeld, 22 R. I. 267, 47 At. 544; Allen-Bradley Co. v.
Anderson, etc., Co., 99 Ky. 311, 35 S. 'W. Z123; Lingwood Zt. Eade, 2 Atk. Sor;'Proctor
v. Williams, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 386; Whitmore v. Smith,. S H. & N. 824; Little v. Newton,
2 Scott N. R. 5o9. Arbitrators have no inherent power to select an umpire unless they are
authorized by the terms of the submission: Allen-Bradley Co. v. Anderson, etc., Co.,
supra.
§ 5. 2 David Harley Co. vt. Barnefield, supra; Soulsby v. Hodgson, 3 Burr. 1474; Caledonia Ry. Co. v. Lockhart, 3 Macq. 8o; Anderson vt. Wallace, 3 CL & Fin. 26; Eads it.
Williams, 4 DeGex, Mac. & Gor. 674.
§ 5. 3Thorp v. Cole, 2 Cr. M. & R. 367; Harry v. Shelton, 7 Bev. 455; Moore v.
Barnett, 1 Ind. 349.
§ 7. 'Berger v. Duff, 4 Johns. (N. i.) Ch. 369; Newton v. Bronson, 13 N. Y. 587, 67
Am. Dec. 89; Lyon it. Jerome, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 485, 37 Am. Dec. 271; Hicks it. Dorn,
42 N. Y. 51; St. Peter i. Denison, 58 N. Y. 42r; Curtis v. Leavitt, x5 N. Y. x9o; The
California, x Sawyer, 603; White v,.Davidson, 8 Md. x6g, 63 Am. Dec. 699; Merrill t.
Farmers, &c., Co., 24 Hun (N. Y.) 3oo; Stoughton i. Baker, 4 Mass. 522, 3 Am. Dec.
236; Terrell it. McCown, 91 Tex. 23r, 43 S. W. 2; Whitlock it. Washburn, 6z Hun
(N. Y.) 369.
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discretion are to be exercised, the body or officer entrusted, with the
duty must exercise it; it cannot be delegated or farmed, out.1
§ 9. AND TO PRIVATE CORPoRATION.----"The general supervision
and direction of the affairs of a corporation," says Mr. Morawetz,
Scare especially intrusted, by the shareholders" to the board of directors; it is upon the personal care and attention of the directors that
the shareholders depend for the success of their enterprise. It follows that authority to delegate these general powers of management
cannot be implied." 1
§

10.

EXC4PTIONS AND MODIVICATION.-But the general rule

above given of course gives way before an express power of delegation or substitution; and it is also subject, as has been stated, to
certain exceptions and modifications growing out of the nature of
the authority or the exigencies and necessities of the case, or based
upon the custom and usage of trade in similar cases. Thus-§ II.
I. SUBAGENT MAY BE EMPLOYED WHEN DUTIES ARE
MECHANICAL OR MINISTERIAL MERELY.-Where in the execution of
the authority an act is to be performed which is of a purely mechanical, ministerial or executive nature, involving no elements of judgment, discretion or personal skill, the reason for the general rule
does not apply, and the power to delegate the performance of it to a
subagent may be implied.'
Thus an agent empowered to execute a promissory note, 2 or to
bind his principal by an accommodation acceptance,3 or to sign his
§8. 1 State v. Hauser, 63 Ind. z55; State v. Bell, 34 Ohio St. x94; Birdsall v. Clark,
73 N. Y. 73, 29 Am. Rep. xos; Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 59x; Matthews v. Alexandria, 68 Mo. 11S, 30 Am. Rep. 776; Maxwell v. Bay City Bridge Co., 41 Mich. 453; Clark
v. Washington, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 54; Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 N. Y. 92; Davis v.
Read, 65 N. Y. 566; Supervisors v. Brush, 77 Ill.
59; Thompson v. Boonville, 61 Mo. 282;
State v. Fiske, 9 R. I. 94; State v. Paterson, 34 N. J. L. z68; Hydes v. J yes, 4 Bush.
(Ky.) 464; Oakland v. Carpentier, 13 Cal. 540; Whyte v. Nashville, a Swan (Tenn.) 364;
Lord v. Oconto, 47 Wis. 386; Lauenstein v. Fond du Lac, 28 Wis. 336; Gale v. Kalamazoo,
23 Mich. 344; Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396; Ruggles v. Collier, 43
Mo. 353; Meuser v. Risdon, 36 Cal. 239; Darling v. St. Paul, x9 Minn. 389; St. Louis v.
Clemens, 43 Mo. 395, S. C. 52 Mo. 133; State v. Garibaldi, 44 La. Ann. 8o9, 11 So. 36;
Blair v. Waco, 75 Fed. 800, 21 C. C. A. 517; People v. McWethy, 177 Ill.
334, 52 N. E.
479; Zanesville v. Zanesville Telephone & Tel. Co., 63 Ohio St. 442, 59 N. E. og; McCrowell v. Bristol, 89 Va. 652, 16 S. E. 867; Knight v. Eureka (Cal.), 55 Pac. 768;
State v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, g9 N. J. L. 11o, 35 Atl. 794; State v. Common Council, 62 N. J. L. 158, 4o Atl. 69o; Lyth v. Buffalo, 48 Hun (N. Y.) 175; Trenton v. Clayton, So Mo. App. 535.
§ 9. 1 Morawetz on Corporations, § 536.
§ i . IWilliams v. Woods, 16 Md. 220; Grinnell v. Buchanan, x Daly (N. Y.) 538;
Eldridge v. Holway, z8 Ill. 445; Joor v. Sullivan, 5 La. Ann. 177; Grady v. American
Cent Ins. Co., 6o Mo. 116; Newell v. Smith, 49 Vt. 255; Lord v. Hall, 8 C. B. 627.
§ 1,. 2Sayre v. Nichols, 7 Cal. 535, 68 Am. Dec. 28o; Lord v. Hall, supra; Weaver
v. Carnall, 35 Ark. 198, 37 Am. Rep. 22.
§ 1. 3 Commercial Bank v. Norton, i Hill (N. Y.) 5ol.
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name to a subscription agreement,4 or to execute a deed, 5 having himself first determined upon the propriety of the act, may direct another
to perform the mechanical act of writing the note or signing the
acceptance, subscription or deed, and the act so performed will be
binding upon the principal.
So an agent authorized to sell real estate, who exercises his own
discretion as to the price and the terms, may employ a subagent to
look up a purchaser," or to point out the land to one contemplating
7
a purchase.
So, in a different field, a city council having power to adopt ordinances may adopt a code compiled by the city attorney. "The adoption, not the compilation, was the legislative act.""
§ 12. II.

WHEN THE PROPER CONDUCT OF THE BUSINESS REQuIRES

IT.-It is obvious, too, that notwithstanding the general rule, there
are many cases wherein from the very nature of the duty, or the circumstances under which it is to be performed, the employment of
subagents is imperatively necessary, and the principal's interests will
suffer if they are not so employed. In such cases, the power to
employ the necessary subagerits will be implied.1 The authority of
the agent is always construed to include the necessary and usual
means to execute it properly.
Thus if a note be sent to a bank for collection, and for the protection of the principal it becomes necessary to have the note protested, the authority of the bank to employ the proper officer will
be implied ;2 and so if a note or draft be sent to a bank of other
agent, 3 to be collected at a distant point, the authority of the bank
§ xi . 4 Norwich University v. Denny, 47 Vt. 13.
§ xi. 5 Smith v. Swan, x Tex. Civ. App. u15, 22 S. V. 247.
§ xx. 'Renwick v. Bancroft, 56 Iowa, 527.
§ x. IMcKinnon v. Vollmar, 7S Wis. 82, 43 N. W. 8oo, 17 Am. St. Rep. 178, 6 L.
R. A. 12x.
§ rx. "Western, etc., R. Co. v. Young, 83 Ga. 512, TO S. E. 197; Garrett v. Janes, 65
Md. 260.
1
§ 12.
DeBussche v. Alt, 8 Ch. Div. 286; Dorchester, &c., Bank v. New England
Bank, z Cush. (Mass.) 177; Johnson v. Cunningham, z Ala. 249; Rossiter v. Trafalgar

Life Assur. Ass'n, 27 Beavan, 377; Appleton Bank v. McGilvray, 4 Gray (Mass.) Sx8, 64
Am. Dec. 92; McCroskey v. Hamilton, xo8 Ga. 64o, 34 S. E.

x1; Strong v'. West,

xo

Ga. 382, 35 S. E. 693; Luttrell v. Martin, x2 N. C. 593, 17 S. E. 573; Kuhnert v.
Angell, xo N. Dak. 59, 84 N. W. 579; Breck v. Meeker, 68 Neb. 99, 93 N. W. 993; McCants v. Wells, 4 S. C. 38!; Canfield v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 59 Mo. App. 354; Tennessee River Transp. Co. v. Kavanaugh (Ala.), 13 So. 283; Rohrbough a'. U. S. Express Co.,
So V. Va. 148, 40 S. E. 398; The Guiding Star, 53 Fed. 936.
§ 12. 2-Tiernan v'. Commercial Bank, 7 How. (Miss.) 648, 40 Am. Dec. 83; Baldwin
v. Bank of Louisiana, x La. Ann. 13, 45 Am. Dec. 72; Commercial Bank v. Martin, x La.
Ann. 344, 45 Am. Dec. 87.
§ 12. 3 Breck v. Meeker, 68 Neb. 99, 93 N. W. 993.
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or other agent to employ a subagent at the place of collection, and
to forward the note or draft to him there, would be presumed.4
So an agent employed to collect a demand by suit would have
implied power to employ the necessary attorneys ;5 or if authorized
to sell goods, to employ a necessary brokei or auctioneer;O or if
authorized to charter a vessel,
to employ a vessel broker to assist
7
him in securing the charter.
§ 13. So an agent of an insurance company given charge of
a large territory or of an extensive business in a smaller territory
and expected to accomplish results which could not reasonably be
demanded of his individual and personal efforts, would have implied
power to appoint such subagents and assistants as the contemplated
results reasonably required.' The mechanical and ministerial parts
would, of course, be delegable within the rule already considered;
but even the discretionary portions might also be delegable in such
a case upon the ground of an implied authority.
§ z2. ' Whether the bank or other agent really undertakes to act as an agent merely
or rather as arf independent contractor is a disputed question. See post, § 23, where the
cases are collected.
§ r2. 5"Commercial Bank v. Martin, supra; Buckland v. Conway, 16 Mass. 396; Davis
v. Matthews, 8 S. Dak. 3oo, 66 N. W. 456.
In Strong v. West, iio Ga. 382, 35 S. E. 693, it is said: "If the services of an attorney are necessary to execute the duties of a created agency, the person intrusted with
those duties, if not himself an attorney, is invested with the power to procure the services
of an attorney for his principal, and * * * the attorney so employed is the attorney
of the principal and not of the agent."
§ 12. 6 Strong v. Stewart, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 137; Harralson v. Stein, 5o Ala. 347. See
also McCants v. Wells, 4 S. C. 381.
§ 12. I Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431.
§ 13. %Bodine v. Exchange Ins. Co., Si N. Y. u17, io Am. Rep. 566; Arff v. Star F.
Ins. Co., 125 N. Y. 57, 25 N. E. 1073, 2i Am. St. Rep. 721, To L. R. A. 6o9; Deitz v.
Ins. Co., 33 W Va 526; Grady it. American Cent. Ins. Co., 6o Mo. i16; Insurance Co. v.
Eshelman, 30 Ohio St. 647; Krumm. v. Insurance Co., 40 Ohio St. 225; Swan V. Insurance
Co., 96 Pa. 37; McGonigle v. Insurance Co., x68 Pa. 1, 3 At]. 875; Insurance Co. v.
Thornton, 13o Ala. 222, 30 So. 614, 55 L. R. A. 547, 89 Am. St. Rep. 3o.
In Bodine %..Exchange Ins. Co., supra, it was said: "We know, according to the
ordinary course of business, that insurance agents frequently have clerks to assist them;
and that they could not transact their business if obliged to attend to all the details in
person, and these clerxs can bind their principals in any of the business which they are
authorized to transact. An insurance agent can authorize his clerk to contract for risks,
to deliver policies, to collect premiums and to take payments of premiums in cash or securities, and to give credit for premiums or to demand cash; and the act of the clerk in all
such cases is the act of the agent, and binds the company just as effectually as if it were
done by the agent in person." This rule has sometimes been cited as authority for a sort
of general power in the ordinary insurance agent to employ clerks who would thereby be
vested with all his powers, discretionary as well as mechanical. Such a view is believed to
be both unsound and dangerous unless the insurance business is to be put upon a different
footing from others. See Waldman v. Insurance Co., 9! Ala. 17o, 8 So. Rep. 666, 24 Am.
St. Rep. 883; Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. v. De Jarnett, isi Ala. 248, 19 So. 99S; distinguished in Insurance Co. v. Thornton, 13o Ala. 222, 30 So. 614, 55 L R. A. 547, 89
Am. St. Rep. 3o; Ruthven v. American F. Ins. Co., 92 Iowa 316, 6o N. W. 663.
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For similar reasons an agent whose employment involves the
performance of duties at various places may be found to have
implied power to employ assistants 2because of the physical impossibility of his performing in person.
And, generally, an agent put in charge of a business or a department of a business which can regularly and, properly be carried on
only by the employment of assistants and subordinates, would,
where no other arrangement is made, have implied power to appoint
them.'
§ 14. III. WHEN JUSTIFIED BY USAGE OR CouRSm op TRADE.Again, the appointment of a subagent may be justified by a known
and established, usage or course of dealing.' Parties contracting in
reference to a subject-matter concerning which there is such a usage
may well be presumed to have it in contemplation. In contractis
tacite insunt quac sunt moris et consuetudinis, is a maxim of law.2
Thus where goods were entrusted by the plaintiff to-a merchandise broker to sell, deliver and receive payment, and the broker
deposited them in accordance with a usage with a commission merchant connected with an auctioneer, taking his note therefor, and
some of the goods were afterward sold at a less price than the
broker was authorized to sell them for, it was held that the principal was bound by such act of the broker and that he could not
maintain trover against the commission merchant. Said the court:
"Business to an immense amount has been transacted in this way,
and the usage being established, it follows that when the plaintiff
authorized -his broker to sell, he authorized him to sell according
to the usage; and when the defendants dealt with the broker, even
if they had known that the goods were not his own, they had a right
to consider him as invested with power to deal according to the
usage."3
The power of a bank receiving a note for collection at another
place, to forward the note to a bank at that place for payment, may
§

33.

2 The Guiding Star; 53 Fed. 936.

§ x3. 3 Breck v. Meeker, 68 Neb. 99, 93 N. 'V. 993; Tennessee River Transp. Co., v.
Kavanaugh (Ala.), 23 So. 283; Luttrell v. Martin, x12 N. C. S93, 17 S. E. 573; Canfield v.
Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 59 Mo. App. 354; McCroskey v. Hamilton, xo8 Ga. 640, 34 S.
E. III.

§ 14. 2 Buckland v. Conway, 16 Mass. 396; Smith v. Sublett, 28 Tex. 163; Lynn v.
Burguoyne, 13 B. Mdn. (Ky.) 4oo; Moon v. Guardians, 3 Bing. N. Cas. 8r4; Gray- v.
Murray, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 167; Darling v. Stanwood, 14 Allen (Mass.) 5o4; Johnson
v. Cunningham, I Ala. 249; Breck v. Meeker, 68 Neb. 99, 93 N. W. 993; Rohrbouigh v.
U. S. Exp. Co., 5o %V.Va. 348, 40 S. E. 398; DeBussche v. Alt, 8 Ch. Div. 286.
§ 14. 2 See Ewell's Evans' Agency, 58.
§ 14. 3 Laussatt v. Lippincott, 6 Serg. & R. (Penn.) 386, 9 Am. Dec. 440. See also
'Wallace v. Bradshaw, 6 Dana (Ky.) 383; Darling v. Stanwood, 14 Allen (Mass.) 504;
Jackson v. Union Bank, 6 H. & J. (Md.) 346; Strong v. Stewart, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 137.
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also be derived from the same source, as may other powers referred
to in the preceding section.4 Usage, however, will not be permitted
to contravene express instructions, and if the agent has been denied
the power of delegation, usage can not confer it.5 Nor can usage
justify the agent in violating the fundamental duties which he owes
to his principal or change the intrinsic character of the contract
existing between them.6
§ 15." IV. WHEN NECEssITy OR SUDDEN EMERGENCY JUSTIFIES
IT.-So there may be cases in which supervening necessity or sudden
emergency may justify the employment of subagents.' Thus, for
example, if a railroad train in transit should suddenly be deprived
of its fireman or brakeman, the authority of the conductor to employ
someone else to fill the place until the necessity was past or the
company could act would doubtless be sustained..2 In England it
is held that the power can not exist if the circumstances are such
that the principal may be communicated with and his instructions
procured. "The impossibility of communicating with the principal,"
said SMITH, L. J., "is the foundation of the doctrine of an agent
of necessity." 3 This is a salutary principle, though not always recognized in the American cases.
§ 16. V. WHEN ORIGINALLY CONT4MPLATED.-And so, if the
appointment of a subagent was contemplated, by the parties at the
time of the creation of the agent's authority, or if it was then
expected that subagents might or would be employed, this would
be treated as at least implied authority for such an appointment.'
§ 17. VI. RATIFICATION OF AN UNAUTHORIZED APPOINTMENT.And, finally, even though authority to appoint subagents cannot be
deduced by any of the methods already enumerated, it may be
§ 14. 4 Wilson v. Smith, 3 How. (U. S.) 763, where the court speaks of it as an
authority fairly to be implied from the usual course of trade or the nature of the transaction.
s
§ 14. 5 Bark dale v. Brown, i Nott. & McC. (S. C.) 517, 9 Am. Dec. 720; Bliss v.
Arnold, 8"Vt. 252, 3o Am. Dec. 467; Hall v. Storrs, 7 Wis. 253; Day v. Holmes, 103
Mass. 3o6; Parsons v. Martin, ii Gray (fass.) 112; Clark v'. Van Northwick, z Pick.
(Mass.) 343; Leland v. Douglass, x Wend. (N. Y.) 490; Catlin v. Smith, 24 Vt. 85; Hutchings v. Ladd, z6 Mich. 493.
§ 14. 6 Robinson v'. Mollett, L. R. 7 H. of L. 802, 14 Eng. Rep. 177; Minnesota Cent.
R. R. Co. v,.
Morgan, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 217.
§ 15. I Gwilliam v,.Twist [1895], 2 Q. B. 84; Georgia Pac. R. Co. v. Propst, 85 Ala.
203, 4 So. 711; Sloan v. Central Iowa Ry. Co., 62 Iowa 728, 16 N. W. 331; Fox v.
Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 86 Iowa 368, 53 N. W. 259, 17 L. R. A. 289.
§ xS. 2 So held in Georgia Pac. Co. v. Propst; Sloan v. Central Iowa Ry. Co.; Fox
V'. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., supra.
§ r5. 3 In Gwilliam v. Twist, supra.
§ 16. ' Johnson v,.Cunningham, i Ala. 249; Duluth Nat. Bank v. Fire Ins. Co., 85
Tenn. 76, 4 Am. St. Rep. 744; National Steamship Co. z.. Sheehan, 122 N. Y. 46z, 25 N.
E. 858 ; DeBussche v. Alt, 8 Ch. Div. 286.
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found that such an appointment has subsequently, with knowledge
of the facts, been either expressly or impliedly ratified;' and here,
as in other cases, such a ratification is equivalent to a prior authority. Knowledge of the facts and voluntary action, however, are as
essential here as elsewhere, and the principal by accepting what he
was entitled to from the agent, in ignorance that a subagent had
been employed, does not ratify -his appointment.2
§ I8. CARE REQUIRED IN MAKING AUTHORIZED APPOINTMENT.Where the appointment of a subagent is authorized, the agent
appointing him does not impliedly warrant that the person selected
by him will be in all respects a fit and proper agent. The measure
of his duty in that regard is to exercise reasonable care and skill to
appoint a suitable person.'
§ 19.- WHOsE AGENT IS THE SUBAGNT.-Wherever a subagent
has been lawfully appointed, in pursuance of the foregoing rules, he
undoubtedly acts so far with the consent of the principal that the
latter is bound by the act of the subagent done within the scope of
the authority conferred upon the original agent. Whether, however,
he is the agent of the principal in such sense that there is a privity
of contract between them-so that, for example, the principal may
or must look to the subagent for redress if the authority be improperly exercised, or that the subagent may or must look only to the
principal for indemnity or compensation-is another matter. The
principal may clearly be willing to consent that his agent may perform the duty through a -substitute employed at the agent's risk and
expense, when he would not be willing, at his own risk and expense,
to have such a substitute employed. The familiar case of the independent contractor furnishes an analogy. The employer here expects
that the contractor will avail himself of agencies and'means selected
by himself and for which he is responsible; but the employer does
not expect to answer for the defaults of the contractor's servants
or to pay them for their services. The principal may consent to the
employment of subagents on such terms as please him, and where he
has consented only upon the express or implied condition that the
subagent shall not be deemed his agent, that condition, as between
the parties, must control.
§ 20..
This distinction has been made in many cases. Thus it
§ 17. 'Teucher v. Hiatt, 23 Iowa 527, 92 Am. Dec. 44o; Sedgwick v. Bliss, 23 Neb.
617, 37 N. W. 483; Dewing v. Hutton, 48 W. Va. 576, 37 S. E. 67o; Bellinger v. Collins, 117 Iowa 173, go N. NV. 6og. See also Terrell v. McCown, g9 Tex. 231, 43 S. W. 2.
§ 17. 2 Rice v. Post, 78 Hun (N. Y.) 547.
§ 18. 1Kuhnert v. Angell, zo N. Dak. 59, 84 N. 'W. 579; Baldwin v. Bank, x La.
Ann. 13, 45 Am. Dec. 72; Tiernan v. Commercial Bank, 7 How. (Miss.) 648, 4o Am. Dec.
83;Conwell v. Voorhees, 13 Ohio 523, 4z Am. Dec. 2o6.
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is said by Senator VRPILANCK in a leading case in New York:
"There is a.wide difference made as well by positive law as by the
reason of the thing itself between a contract or undertaking to do a
thing, and the delegation of an agent or attorney to procure the doing
of the same thing-between a contract for" building a house, for
example, and the appointment of an overseer or superintendent,
authorized and undertaking to act for the principal in having the
house built. The contractor is bound to answer for any negligence or
default in the performance of his contract, although such negligence
or default be not his own, but that of some sub-contractor or under
workman. Not so the mere representative agent who discharges his
whole duty if he acts with good faith and ordinary diligence in the
selection of his materials, the forming of his contracts and the choice
of his W7orkmen."
§ 21.
-The
same distinction is also stated in much the same
way by MR. JusTIcz BLATCHVORD in the Supreme Court of the United
States. "The distinction," he says, "between the liability of one
who contracts to do a thing and, that of one who merely receives a
delegation of authority to act for another is a fundamental one. If
the agency is an undertaking to do the business, the original principal may look to the-immediate contractor with himself, and is not
obliged to look to inferior or distant under-contractors or subagents
when defaults occur injurious to his interest. * * * The nature
of the contract is the test. If the contract be only for the immediate
services of the agent, and for his faithful conduct as representing his
principal, the responsibility ceases with the limits of the personal
services undertaken. :Sut when the contract looks mainly to the
thing to be done, and the undertaking is for the due use of all proper
means to performance; the responsibility extends to all necessary
and proper means to accomplish the object, by whomsoever used.",
§ 22.
-So
where the question was as to the liability of a factor
for the defaults of another to whom he had sent the goods for sale, the
latter [the defendant] contended that if plaintiffs [the principals]
told him to "do with the goods as with his own," or if "the employment of a subagent .was necessary, and. that fact was known to
plaintiffs," then, in either event, defendant has a right to send the
goods to a factor of good credit, to whom and. not to the defendant,
plaintiffs should look for their proper disposition. But the court
said, "We do not think that if the jury had found both of these facts
in favor of defendant it necessarily followed that he would not be
liable for the default of the person so selected. The inquiry still
§ 2o.

§ 2r.

Allen v. Merchants' Bank, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 215.

Exchange National Bank v. Third National Bank, Z12 U. S. 276.
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remained, was this person selected as the servant of the agent or
factor, or did he become the agent of the principal? It by no means
follows, where produce, for instance, is intrusted, to a commission
merchant in Dubuque, and sent forward by him to his correspondent
or agent at Chicago or St. Louis, that a privity of contract exists
between such correspondent and principal, to the extent that the
original factor is released and the subagent only is liable, Nor does
it make any difference that the principal .or consignor knows that it
must and will be sent forward to fiild a market. He has a right to,
and is presumed to repose confidence in, the financial ability and
business capacity of the person so employed, and if such factor
employs other persons, he does so upon his own responsibility; and,
having greater facilities for informing himself and extending his
business relations, upon him and not upon the principal should fall
the loss of any negligence or default. If, however, another person
has been substituted who, with the knowledge and approbation of
the principal, takes the place of the original factor, or if such substitution is necessary from the very nature of the business, and this
fact is known to the principal, the liability of the substitute may be
direct to the principal, depending upon questions of good faith and
the like on the part of the factor in selecting the substitute."'
§ 23.
- The form in which the question most frequently
presents itself is in determining the liability of a bank for the
defaults of its correspondent banks in the process of collecting
checks, notes and the like delivered to it for collection. Upon this
question the authorities are hopelessly in conflict-not, however, as
to the rule of liability when the nature of the undertaking is determined but as to the, proper construction of the facts in deciding upon
the nature of the undertaking.1
§ 24. EFFECT ov APPOINTMXNT.-It is not the purpose here to
go minutely into the mutual rights and obligations of the principal,
§ 22. 2 Loomis v. Simpson, 13 Iowa 332.

§ 23. 'See Exchange Nat. Bank v.'Third Nat. Bank, 112 U. S. 276; Mackerey v. Ramsay, 9 Cl. & Fin. 818; Ayrault v. Pacific Bank, 47 N. Y. 570, 7 Am. Rep. 489; Simpson v.
NValdby, 63 Mich. 439, 3o N. W. i99; Bank v. Butler, 41 Ohio St. 519, 52 Am. Rep. 94;
Titus v. Bank, 35 N. J. L. 588; Power v. First Nat. Bank, 6 Mont. 252, z2 Pac. 597; Streissguth v. Nat. Bank, 43 Minn. 5o. Compare Fabens v. Mercantile Bank, 23 Pick. 330, 34
Am. Dec. 59; Lawrence v. Stonington Bank, 6 Conn. 521; Jackson v. Union Bank, 6 H. &
J. (Md.) 146; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Alton Bank, 25 Ill.243; Stacy v. Dane County Bank, ,2
Vis. 629; Guelick v. Nat. State Bank, 56 Iowa 434, 41 Am. Rep. izo; Third Nat. Bank v.
Vicksburg Bank, 61 Miss. 112, 48 Am. Rep. 78; Daly v. Bank, 56 Mo. 94, 17 Am. Rep. 663;
Bank of Louisville v. First Nat. Bank, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) xoz, 3 Am. Rep. 691; Merchants
Nat. Bank v. Goodman, iog Pa. 422, 58 Am. Rep. 728; Hyde v. Planters' Bank, 17 La. 56o;
Irwin v. Reeves Pulley Co., 20 Ind. App. 1o, 48 N. E. 6oi. This list does not purport to
be exhaustive.
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agent, and subagent. This subject is reserved for subsequent consideration. ButIt general.-If, under the circumstances, it appears that the agent
employed the subagent for his principal, and by his 'authority,
expressed or implied, then the subagent is the agent of the principal
and is directly responsible to the principal for his conduct; and if
damage results from the conduct of such subagent, the agent is only
responsible in case he has.not exercised due care in the selection of
the subagent.
But if the agent, having undertaken to transact the business of
his principal, employs a subagent on his own account to assist him
in what he has undertaken to do, he does so at his own risk, and
there is no privity between such subagent and the principal. The
subagefit is, therefore, the agent of the agent only and is responsible
to him for his conduct, while the agent is responsible to the principal
for the manner in which the business has been done, whether by
himself, or his servant or his agent.'
FLOYD R. MlcHEM.
UNIVMSIrY OP CHICAGO.
§ 24. 1Appleton Bank v. McGilvray, 4 Gray (Mass.) Sx8, 64 Am. Dec. 92; Sexton v.
Weaver, 141 Mass. 273; Campbell v. Reeves, 3 Head (Tenn.) 226; Commercial Bank v.
Jones, x8 Tex. Six; Barnard v. Coffin, 141 Mass. 37, 55 Am. Rep. 443; Warren Bank v.
Suffolk Bank, io Cush. (Mass.) 582; Pownall v. Bair, 78 Penn. St. 403; Darling v. Stanwood, 14 Allen (Mass.) 5o4; Stephens v. Babcock, 3 B. & Adol. 354; McCants v. Wells,
4 S. C. 381; Hoag v. Graves, 81 Mich. 628, 46 N. W. iog; Davis v. King, 66 Conn. 465,
34 AtI. 107, So Am. St. Rep. 104. Where it is understood that a steamship agent is to
have subagents, and the agent distributes tickets among them, he is not liable in replevin
for the tickets in the hands of subagents after the termination of his agency, as the subagents are also agents of the company. National Steamship Co. vi. Sheahan, x22 N. Y.
461, 2 N. E. 858. A sales agent, whose duty is to take orders for his principal's goods
within a certain territory, and who can delegate his authority only to the extent of employing his own salesmen, cannot make a contract with a salesman which will bind the principal
to pay the salesman for his services in making sales. National Cash Reg. Co. v. Hagan
(Tex. Civ. App.) 83 S. ,V. 727.
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